摘要
首先在无约束的市场条件下建立了一个进化博弈模型说明信贷市场的基本进化规律 ,并通过对模型参数的分析来说明达到良好市场行为的策略和方法 .然后 ,通过加入法律监督并对逃避还贷的企业予以处罚等市场约束条件对模型进行改进并做出分析 ,说明在创造良好的市场环境和退出“闭锁”的过程中 ,政府干预十分重要 .最后 。
An evolutionary game model is constructed to study the basic evolution law of the credit market with no restriction. How to reach good market behavior is illustrated by analyzing and controlling model parameters. Then the model is improved by adding some restrictions such as law to show that government plays an important role in forming good market environment and exiting the 'lock in'. Finally, some beneficial results and suggestions about how to standardize credit market behavior are given.
出处
《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第4期483-486,共4页
Journal of Southeast University:Natural Science Edition
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 1710 2 8)