摘要
供需链是由物流、信息流和资金流联接起来的多个实体构成的供需网络。由于链上的各个实体具有独立的决策权,所以由此引发的信息结构的非对称和决策激励的不一致问题,是导致该分布式系统低效的最主要的原因。本文以一个两阶段的供需链系统为背景,分别论述了在供应商和零售商起主导作用下的两类Stackelberg博弈,给出了博弈的Nash均衡解,并分析了这两种情况下供应商的批发价和零售商的订货量与零售价的变化,然后结合集中式控制系统,分析了分布式系统低效的原因,最后给出了实例,并验证了结果。
Because of the asymmetric information and incompatible incentives in independent decision-makers of supply chain, the optimization in traditional supply chain management is impossible to be realized in practice and the decisions that are locally optimal can be inefficient from a global perspective. In this paper, two kinds of Stackelberg game models are developed and analyzed. One kind of model is that the supplier is dominant; the other is that the buyer is dominant. In these two kinds of models, the Nash equilibrium solution is derived, and the changes of trade price, order quantity and retail price are studied. Moreover, the differences of the centralized and decentralized system are analyzed. Finally, through experimental analysis, the result is validated.
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60174046)。~~
