摘要
着重探讨了在电力市场环境中信息不完全情况下 ,发电厂商竞价策略的问题。采用经济学上的Cournot模型 ,考虑不对称及对称 2种不完全信息情况 ,用博弈的方法分析了这 2种情况下的发电厂商竞价策略问题 ,把求取 Nash均衡解划归为相应的优化问题。文末用一个简单的算例 。
The problems of competitive bidding strategies of generation companies with incomplete information in the power market were emphatically analyzed. The Cournot model of economics was adopted in considering of two different incomplete information of company cost functions: asymmetric incomplete information and symmetric incomplete information. The gaming theory was used to analyze competitive bidding strategies and to find the Nash equilibrium solution equivalent to the optimal problem solution. A simple sample was taken to calculate the optimal generated electricity and market electricity price under various circumstance of incomplete information.
出处
《华东电力》
北大核心
2003年第7期5-8,共4页
East China Electric Power
