不确定信息静态博弈

Static Game Model of Incomplete Information

传统的博弈理论中假定局中人具有共同知识 由于现实中各局中人获取信息的途径不同,信息具有不确定性,局中人具有共同知识这一假定往往不能满足 因此,需要讨论不确定信息博弈问题 基于认识效用决策理论,讨论了不确定信息静态博弈问题 假定各局中人仅知道其它局中人类型的分布,并利用拟Bayes理论建立了不确定信息静态博弈模型。

The traditional game theory is based on the assumption that all the players have full knowledge. This assumption, however, can not be usually met in practice because of the incompletion of information and the difference between ways used by the players to acquire information. As a result, the static game with incomplete infromation should be discussed. According to the epistemic utility theory, the static game with incomplete information is discussed. Based on the hypothesis that each player only knows the set of the distribution of other players' type, a static game model of incomplete information is set up by applying the quasiBayesian theory.