摘要
通过建立一个两阶段博弈模型 ,研究了风险投资者持股比例对风险企业 IPO的影响。由于风险投资者重复地参与到资本市场 ,将两阶段博弈扩展至无期限重复博弈 ,并得出了以下结论 :若风险投资者的持股比例 e大于一定阈值 ,风险投资者将选择高质量的风险企业进行 IPO;若 e小于一定阈值 ,风险投资者将选择低质量的风险企业进行 IPO。
The paper builds a two staged game model to analyse the effect on venture corporate IPO caused by venture capitalists' share ratio. Due to venture capitalists repeatedly coming to venture market, we extend two stages model to repeated game without stage limit. We draw the following conclusion: if venture capitalists' share ratio is higher than a critical constant, the venture capitalists will have an incentive to select the high qualify venture corporate IPO; if venture capitalists' share ratio is lower than a critical constant, the venture capitalists will have an incentive to select the low qualify venture corporate IPO. This conclusion is very instructive to both venture capitalists and investors outside.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
2003年第2期133-135,共3页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
