不对称信息下短视代理人的投资行为

Investment Behavior of Myopic Agent under Asymmetry Information

信息不对称下短视代理人投资行为如何扭曲长期悬而未解 ,BS经营短视行为低效率一般化特征的结论 ,依赖于限制性信息假设条件 ,因而并不具有普适性 ;Paul证明了隐藏行动类型并不必然导致长期项目过低投资 ,笔者对隐藏信息类型分析的结论是 :一般来说 ,对长期项目过度投资 。

The investment behavior distortion of myopic agent with asymmetry information has remained unsolved,the BS characterization of the inefficiency from managerial myopic hinges on a restrictive informational assumption and therefore is not generally applicable. Paul demonstrates that it is not necessarily true that hidden-action type leads to under-investment in long-run projects. We examine the hidden-information type and arrive on analysis:in general,over-investment in the long-run project can be ensured only if the manager has more information than the stock market about the long-run project,but not about the short-run project.