政府内部土地收益分配的博弈分析

Study on Distribution of Land Incomes Between Governments by the Game Theory

随着土地有偿使用制度不断完善,中央政府和地方各级政府作为土地收益的所有者,在其内部产生了土地收益分配的矛盾。虽然中央政府一再通过法律、法规的形式明确其与地方政府间的收益分配关系,但实践中由于巨大经济利益驱动,中央政府一直收不到应得的土地收益。就这一问题,文中应用经济学理论的博弈分析方法,分析得出中央政府在加强财政监督体制、产权约束机制、土地基金专项管理机制等的同时,采用降低土地收益分配比例政策,而地方政府在中央政府约束机制的制约下,采用扩大土地收益分配比例政策,是解决政府内部土地收益分配矛盾的合理政策策略途径。

With the development of land compensated use system, there comes the contradiction between the central government and the local government, who act as the owners of land incomes. The central government defines the income-distribution relationship between local government and itself by law frequently, but due to the strongly economic driving force, the central government can抰 obtain the part belonging to itself in reality. Therefore, applying the game theory, the paper come to the conclusion that the logical policy tactic to resolve this problem is that the central government should adopt the policy of reducing land income-distribution ratio besides the reinforcement of the financial supervision mechanism, land property right restriction mechanism and land-fund concentration management mechanism and so on; and the local government should adopt the policy of magnifying land income-distribution ratio under the condition of restriction mechanism by the central government.