摘要
运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论分析了管理者和生产者之间的委托代理关系 ,研究了生产管理者如何激励生产者努力降低成本的问题。分别建立了信息对称 (不存在道德风险 )和信息不对称 (存在道德风险 )两种情况下的模型 。
The principal-agent relation between managers and producers is analyzed with the principal-agent theory in information economics, and measures of managers to stimulate producers to reduce cost is discussed. The models under symmetric information condition (without moral hazard) and asymmetric information condition (with moral hazard)are given, and the strategies used by managers under the two conditions to stimulate producers to reduce cost are discussed respectively.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
2003年第4期55-58,共4页
Industrial Engineering and Management
