激励机制与资本结构:理论与中国实证

The Encouragement Mechanism and Capital Structure:The Theory and a Case Study of China

在现代公司运行中 ,资本结构与激励机制之间的关系非常复杂和微妙。本文首先对公司股东或债权人是如何通过融资渠道 (尤其是债务融资 )的选择来约束经理层的自利行为的资本结构理论做了一个综述。以此为基础 ,我们对中国市场导向 (民营 )与行政导向 (国有控股 )两种高管激励模式之于资本结构的影响提出四个理论假说 ,并进行了实证检验。结果表明 ,理论假说与来自实践的结论是截然相反的。我们认为这种理论和实践的背离暗示了在中国资本市场中 ,特殊的市场环境决定了高管激励机制并没有成为能够显著影响资本结构的一个制度性因素。因此 ,如果市场环境没有根本性变革的背景下 ,单纯地强调高管激励模式的市场化改革 (包括年薪制、股权激励、经理期权等等 )

Very complicated and subtle is the relationship between capital structure and encouragement sysˉtem in the operation of modern companies.In this article we have,first of all,made a comprehensive description of the capital structure of how company shareholders or creditors,by the selection of fiˉnancing channels(especially by running into debt)constrain managers'selfish behaviors.On this basis,we have suggested four hypotheses about the effect of two kinds of models encouraging high-ranking managers in China's market-oriented(private)enterprises and administration-oriented(state-conˉtrolled)enterprises upon capital structure,and have tested the hypotheses by a case study,only to find them quite contrary to the conclusion derived from what have actually happened.In our opinion,the deviation of theory from practice suggests that in China's capital market the special market settings underlie the fact that the mechanism intended to encourage high-ranking managers has by no means become a factor,in terms of system,that noticeably affects capital structure.Consequently,if the market environment does not revolute,the emphasis only on commercialization reform in the form of spurring high-level managers(including annual salary system,encouragement by being given more shares,'anager's option',etc.)cannot fundamentally change the managing goal and behavior of high-ranking managers of China's listed companies.