摘要
商业广告语得因使用而获得识别商品来源之显著性,进而成为受法律保护的商业标识。洛克的劳动财产权说无法为付出智力劳动收获排他性财产权提供正当性支持,以商标的来源功能确定涉案广告语之利益归属更为适宜。《反不正当竞争法》一般条款之适用有待于限定条件的满足以及内涵之具体化。对本案纠纷处理结果的理性认识应当从认识论上的转变开始。将'怕上火'广告语所属的识别性利益归属于王老吉,但不赋予其对'怕上火'这一词汇的垄断性专有使用权,从功利主义的角度更符合社会整体福利的提高。
The use of commercial advertising slogan makes it acquiredistinctiveness through which the source of goods can be identified. As a result,commercial advertising slogan, as one kind of commercial marks, is protected bylaw. The labor theory of property by Locke cannot explain how to gain anexclusive property right through brainwork. It is more appropriate to determinethe ownership of interests of advertising slogan involved in this case on the basisof source fimction of trademark. Hie adoption of general provisions of Anti-Unfair Competition Law needs to satisfy its restrictions and to ciystallize itsimplication. The rational knowledge of results of dispute in this case should startfrom the shift in epistemology.
出处
《清华知识产权评论》
2017年第1期149-169,共21页
Tsinghua Intellectual Property Review
关键词
广告语
商业标识
反不正当竞争法
一般条款
劳动财产说
Advertising Slogan
Commercial Mark
Anti-Unfair CompetitionLaw
General Principle
Labor Theory of Property