经济政策不确定性、内部控制与债务融资

本文运用2013年芝加哥大学教授DAVIS等人所构建的中国经济政策不确定性指数和DIB上市企业内部控制指数,探讨了经济政策不确定性和内部控制对企业建立债务契约的影响。实证结果表明:随着经济政策不确定性的提高,会使得企业获得借款的可能性明显降低;此外,良好的内部控制制度可以缓解经济政策不确定性对债务契约所造成的负面影响。因此,本文提出如下建议:政府应该加强政策信息披露机制,降低经济政策不确定风险;企业应该加强内部控制质量,提升债务契约建立可能性;债权人应完善信息披露监督机制,防范投资风险。

This paper discusses the impact of economic policy uncertainty and internal control on the establishment of debt contract by using China’s economic policy uncertainty and DIB listed companies’ internal control index, which were constructed by DAVIS et al., a professor at the University of Chicago in 2013. The results show that, when economic policy uncertainty becomes larger, it will make the possibility of obtaining loans lower. However, a good internal control system can mitigate the adverse effect of economic policy uncertainty on debt contract. We put forward three suggestions: the government should strengthen the policy information disclosure mechanism and reduce the risk of economic policy uncertainty, enterprises should strengthen internal control quality, and improve the chances of establishing debt contracts, and creditors should perfect the supervision mechanism of information disclosure mechanism and guard against investment risk.