摘要
最近一些顶级的神经科学家主张了一个明显错误的观点:一个人类的人格化者(a human person)就是他或她的大脑。这个错误主张部分地源于'一个人格化者(personhood/a person)'这个概念本身的困难,因为很难去说清楚什么是'一个人格化者'。本文通过揭示'一个人格化者'这个概念的特征的无限丰富性去解释为什么这个概念是如此地让人头疼。本文对比笛卡尔和洛克两个大哲学家的'一个人格化者'的概念。笛卡尔的'一个人格化者'概念有四个特征:(1)它是一个心灵—身体的统一体的概念;(2)它是一个天赋的和源始性(即不可分析性的)的概念;(3)它不是一个清楚分明的概念(因为它是如此源始的以至于不能被还原为清楚分明的概念);(4)它是极其有用的概念(因为它帮助我们去消解而不是解决了笛卡尔的身心关系问题)。相应地,洛克的'一个人格化者'概念对应有四个不同的特征:(1)它是一个因为其行为(包括心灵行为)而被奖惩的实体的概念;(2)它既不是天赋的观念(洛克没有所谓的天赋观念)也不是源始性的概念,而是一个可以还原为意识和记忆的复杂观念;(3)它是清楚分明的概念(因为它由清楚分明的简单概念所构成);(4)它是极其重要的概念(不是因为它帮助我们解决或消解了身心关系问题,而是因为它是正义和利己概念的核心)。通过对比本文表明'一个人格化者'的概念拥有不可耗尽的丰富性,这个丰富性是由历史所造成的。因为这个概念被许多思想家作为概念工具或作为技术性或半技术性术语去回答那些在非常不同的甚至不可公度的理论框架下被提出的各种问题,从而许多不同的特征都被引入到这个'一个人格化者'的概念之中。我们对于这个概念其实并没有一个统一的直觉性的把握,而仅仅只有一个共同的传统,这个传统遗留给我们混杂着很多不同特征的'一个人格化者'概念,这些不同特征在过去从未打算被协调地整合在一起。'一个人格化者'概念的特征的无限性可能是由如下三个原因所造成:(1)这个概念在其概念应用上是以人类为中心的;(2)但是这个概念在其内涵上却完全不是以人类为中心;(3)这个特征[人格化者的集体(persons)是极其有价值的]也是'一个人格化者'概念的一部分。
Some leading neuro-scientists recently proclaimed an obviously false view that a human person is his/her brain.This falsity arises partly from the conceptual difficulties concerning personhood/a person.By revealing inexhaustible richness of the characteristics of this concept of a person,this essay explains why the concept is so utterly puzzling.The author contrasts Descartes’ concept of a person with Locke’s.For Descartes,the concept has four features:(1) it is the concept of the mind/body-union;(2) it is innate and a primitive(i.e.unanalysable) concept;(3) it is not clear-and — distinct(because it is primitive so that it cannot be reduced to clear-and — distinct concepts);(4) it is of enormous value(because it helps us to dissolve,not to solve,the mind/body-problem).Correspondingly,Locke’s concept of a person has another four features;(1) it is the concept of an entity which is justly rewarded/punished for its doings(including mental doings) j(2) it is neither innate(no so-called innate concepts in Locke) nor primitive,but rather a complex idea which is reducible to the concepts of consciousness and memory;(3) it is clear and distinct(because it is made of clear and distinct simple concepts);(4) it is of enormous importance(not because it helps us to solve or dissolve the mind/body-problem,but because it is central to our conceptions of justice and self-care).Through the two examples,this article argues that the concept of a person indeed has inexhaustible richness that is historically caused because this concept is used by many thinkers as a conceptual tool or as a technical or semi-technical term for answering different questions in various distinct and incommensurable theoretical frameworks,so that quite different features have been introduced as characteristics of a person.Thus,we do not have a shared intuitive grasp of this concept,but only a common learned tradition which has bequeathed to us a blend of quite diverse conceptual features that were never meant to go together.The characteristic inexhaustibility of the concept of a person may result from the following reasons;(1) this concept is anthropocentric in its actual application;(2) it is not at all anthropocentric in its intension;(3) it is part of the concept of a person that persons are distinctively valuable.
出处
《清华西方哲学研究》
2015年第1期368-399,共32页
Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy