德勒兹论运动——影像以及非主体性意识的可能性

Deleuze on Movement-image and the Possibility of Non-subjective Consciousness

本文将主要分析德勒兹基于运动—影像理论的意识概念。在其专著《电影1:运动—影像》中,德勒兹直接将运动—影像理论作为电影研究方法使用,同时也间接由这个理论提出了不同于现象学的意识概念。现象学将意识视为总是关于某物的意识(toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose)o通过分析这一命题,德勒兹反思了现象学中的主体优先性。这种优先性使现象学无法有效解释无主体的电影运动。针对这一缺陷,德勒兹将目光投向柏格森,并提出:'意识即某物(toute conscience est quelque chose)。'为理解德勒兹的观点,本文将首先回顾德勒兹对于现象学的批评。之后,文章将解释德勒兹的主要思想来源,即柏格森的《物质与记忆》。在该书中,柏格森提出了与胡塞尔不同的另一种意识理论。接下来,文章将展示德勒兹对于柏格森意识理论的发展和推进。这个推进的结果即是运动—影像理论。该理论既能弥补现象学的缺陷,又能为理解电影提供新路径。最后,文章将聚焦于德勒兹对于主体性问题的立场。这一立场将有助于理解德勒兹对于现象学的顾虑及其对于柏格森的青睐。

This paper analyzes Deleuze’s concept of consciousness based on his doctrine of movement-image.In his work Cinema 1:the Movement-image,Deleuze employs this doctrine as an approach to cinema study and then proposes indirectly a notion of consciousness which is distinct from the phenomenological notion of consciousness; "All consciousness is consciousness of something." An analysis of this phenomenological proposition suggests that the privilege of subjectivity disenables phenomenology to interpret a cinema movement without subjectivity properly.Therefore,Deleuze appeals to Bergson and argues for a Bergsonian concept of consciousness: " Consciousness is something." In order to clarify Deleuze’s view,I reconstruct his critique on phenomenology,then present Bergson’s theory of perceptual consciousness(different from Husserl’s version) in the Matter and Memory,and reveal the procedure in which he proposes the doctrine of movement-image by correcting Bergson’s theory of consciousness.Deleuze’s doctrine of movement-image can overcome the defects of phenomenology and offer a better approach to cinema analysis.The last section of this paper focuses on Deleuze’s position on subjectivity,which is of great help for us to understand why Deleuze prefers Bergsonism to phenomenology.