胡塞尔先验现象学中的质料与原初联想

Hyle and Primordial Association in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology

本文讨论的主题是胡塞尔现象学中的质料概念。本文将首先展示胡塞尔在第一次表述其先验现象学的代表著作《观念I》中支持的一种无形式的质料概念。然而,这一概念的使用给他先验现象学的整体框架带来了诸多困难,由此也引来了许多批评。其次,作为对上述困难的回应,胡塞尔在《被动综合分析》这部讲课稿中,创造性地发展了一种新的质料概念。这一新的质料概念根植于胡塞尔对于原初联想这一基于时间意识的构成性活动的发现和分析。这一新的质料概念,不仅使得胡塞尔可以回应基于《观念I》而来的批评,而且揭示了感知活动中包含的意识被动综合的层次,及其本质结构和认识论贡献。

This paper focuses on the concept of " hyle" in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.First of all,it shows that in his major work Ideen I,Husserl favours a concept of "the formless hyle",which lacks any kind of intellectual apprehensions.This conception of " hyle" has given rise to much criticism.Secondly,I present that in the 1920 s,as a response to the criticism,Husserl develops a new conception of "hyle" which is rooted in his discovery and analysis of primordial association based on the constructive act of inner time-consciousness.This new conception not only reveals the passive synthesis of consciousness in our perceptive experience,its essential structure,and its epistemological meaning as well,but also helps respond to the criticism on the concept of "the formless hyle".