休谟的工具实践理性观念

Hume’s Conception of Practical Reason

本文旨在考察并清楚地理解休谟的工具实践理性观念。根据工具论的实践理性观念,理性唯有指导行为而起工具性作用才是实践的。休谟的工具理性观念出发点是他对传统道德理性主义的战斗论题(即理所当然地认为在理性和控制意志的情感之间存在着持续的战斗)的批判。所以,本文将首先考察休谟所面对的道德理性主义的主流传统,然后,将详细分析和讨论构成休谟的工具理性理论的各个基本命题。休谟的工具理性理论是建立在其著名的理性-奴隶论题的基础之上的。休谟用来支持理性奴隶论题的命题有三个:理性单独不能决定意志和行为;理性并不反对情感,以及唯有情感或欲望才能驱动意志和行为。由这三个命题直接引申出,理性是情感的奴隶。理性只有与情感或欲望联合起来才能驱动意志和行为,而在这种驱动机制中,理性永远处于服从和服务的地位,永远只有充当手段或工具,以便实现由情感或欲望所设定的目的。

The sole purpose of the present article is to reexamine and clarify Hume’s conception of practical reason,according to which reason can be practical insofar as it plays an instrumental role as a guide of action.Hume’s account of his own version of the concept of practical reason starts with its critique of the traditional battle thesis:It had been taken for granted that there is a constant battle between reason and passions for control over the will.This article thus begins by examining the mainstream rational tradition of morality confronting Hume and his criticism thereof,and then analyzes and discusses several basic claims in which Hume’s theory of instrumental reason consists.This theory is based on the famous reason-slave thesis that'reason is,and ought only to be the slave of passions.'Hume makes use of the following three claims in favor of his reason-slave thesis:1)Reason alone cannot determine the will and its action;2)Reason is by no means entitled to opposition to passions;And 3)only passions or desires are in a position to push the will into acting.It follows that reason is the slave of passion.Only coupled with passions or desires can reason motivate the will towards action,in which case,being put into the instrumental standing in the motivation,reason can only serve as a means to an antecedent end set by passions or desires.