作为反形而上学原则的关系唯名主义

Relational Nominalism as the Principle of Anti-metaphysics

福柯与马克思都消解了本质,从而抛弃了哲学阵地。本文首先从文本上追溯了福柯与马克思对本质之消解的观点来源,其次分析了两者是以何种方式消解本质的,最后阐明了他们如何避免了重返形而上学。由此可以得知,在这一消解本质的过程中,关系唯名主义是关键,作为一种新唯名主义,它并不以个体为优先;而通过关注实践与历史,福柯与马克思则确保了思想的大地性,避免了重返形而上学。通过这一分析,我们将能够进一步探索这两种理论上的反人文主义对于反思今天关于人类的话语的作用。

Both Foucault and Marx deconstructed the concept of essence,thus abandoned the front of philosophy.This article firstly traces the sources of the viewpoint that they deconstructed the concept of essence,then analyzes the ways they intended to achieve that,and lastly illustrates how they avoided returning to metaphysics.It is concluded that relational nominalism is the key in this process.As a new nominalism,it doesn’t give priority to individuals.And by concentrating on practice and history,Foucault and Marx ensured the earthliness of thoughts and avoided the return to metaphysics.Through this analysis,this article further explores the role of these two theoretical variants of anti-humanism in reflecting on today’s discourse on human beings.