异议的价值与诸种妥协的本质

Value of Disaccord and Nature of Compromises

异议的重要性和限度的问题,需要将道德价值、推理判断和多元主义彼此结合起来。如果对道德多元主义的承认能够导向对异议的接受,那么对于面对道德价值的审慎态度的研究旨趣就会转向另一个方向。实际上,维持下来的异议能够被吸收到一种妥协的形成之中,这种妥协搁置了道德要求。在这项研究中,这种双重导向是在一种规范与协商过程的动态的视角下得到研究的。它将允许我们为没有完全得到贯彻的推理确保一定的地位。在这一视角下,社会中的相互调整——尤其是围绕着社会权利和社会福利国家的志向的那些调整——可以一同在对异议的承认和造成共识的推理之上取得支撑。在要求困难的妥协的那些情况下,对于异议的承认会导致一些伦理选择,而与之相联系的那些遗憾对于偏好其他选择的人来说,并不会真的显得是被其他考虑所补偿了的。对于形成这样的妥协的规范性赌注,本文以一种倾向于辩护其伦理和政治利益的方式进行了考察。最后,受到引导的商谈会从考虑那些贯穿社会中的人的生活的张力出发,使得我们可以重新审视社会进步主义的某些方面。

The examination of the importance and limit of disaccord makes it necessary to incorporate moral values,reasoned judgments,and pluralism.If the recognition of pluralism disposes itself to accept the disaccords,the objective of the research of reasoned attitudes faced with moral values will go toward another direction.In fact,the remaining disaccord can be assimilated into a form of compromises that suspend moral exigencies.In this study,this double orientation is approached from a perspective of the dynamics of norms and the concertation process.This is what permits to assure a role for the reasons which are not integrally followed.In this perspective,the reciprocal adjustments in society-especially about the social rights and the objectives of the social state-can all be supported by the recognition of disaccord and the consensus-making reasoning.In the situations which call for difficult compromises,the recognition of disaccords leads to certain moral choices,and the associated regrets cannot really appear to be compensated by other considerations for those who have preferred other choices.The normative stakes of the formation of such compromises are examined in a way which tends to defend their ethical and political interest.Finally,the guided discussion permits to reexamine certain aspects of social progressism,starting from taking into consideration the tensions which traverse the life of a person in society.