摘要
我首先论证,为何斯坦利和威廉姆森没有消除知道什么和知道怎么之间的区别。然后论证,知道怎么在于用一种特殊的方式对参与活动的方式进行思考。因此知道什么与知道怎么之间的区别有两点:知道什么和知道怎么的对象不同;而当我们拥有知道什么和知道怎么时,我们怀有知识对象的方式也不同。我最后考察最近两个理智主义者在知道怎么上的努力,并指出他们为何失败。
I first argue why Stanley and Williamson fail to eliminate the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Then I argue that knowledge-how consists in a special kind of ways of thinking of ways of engaging in actions. So the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how is twofold: the objects of knowledge-that and knowledge-how are different;the ways in which we entertain the object of knowledge are also distinct when we have knowledge-that and knowledge-how. At the end, I consider two recent intellectualist efforts on knowledge-how and show why they fail.
作者
任会明
李超瑞(译)
REN Huiming;LI Chaorui(trans.)(School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University, Jinan;Department of Philosophy, Tsinghua University, Beijing)
出处
《清华西方哲学研究》
2018年第1期17-38,共22页
Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy
基金
重点大学基础研究资金和教育部人文社科项目(项目号11YJC 720036)的支持
关键词
知道怎么
知道什么
理智主义
Knowledge-how
knowledge-that
intellectualism