克里普克的专名理论与亚里士多德的“个体”

Kripke’s Theory of Proper Names and Aristotle’s “Individuals”

克里普克的专名理论在根本上是和亚里士多德的实体理论相一致的。通过专名,我们可以直接确认个体实体本身,而摆脱对实体偶性的依赖,由此真正确立本质个体的实体——主体地位。本质个体的实体——主体地位是亚里士多德实体理论的核心思想,本文将通过对克里普克专名理论的阐释来解读亚里士多德的个体实体理论。

Kripke’s theory of proper names is essentially consistent with Aristotle’s substance theory. By proper names, we can identify an individual substance directly without reliance on accidents of the substance;and in this way, the substance-subject position of essential individuals can be actually established. The substance-subject position is the core of Aristotle’s substance theory. This article understands Aristotle’s substance theory of individuals by Kripke’s theory of proper names.