实践理性相对于审美判断力的优先性?——关于康德的审美自律学说的再思考

The Priority of Practical Reason over Aesthetic Judgment?Reconsideration of Kant’s Theory of Aesthetic Autonomy

在阐释康德哲学内部实践理性和审美判断力的关系、实践理性的自律与审美自律的关系时,Paul Guyer援引了康德的'实践理性优先性'的学说,认为实践理性和道德相对于审美判断力具有优先性。Guyer的这一观点在学界很有影响。我的讨论将从三个方面展开:1,我认为,不适于将'实践理性的优先性'这一表述引入关于《判断力批判》的讨论中并主张实践理性相对于审美判断力的优先性。与《实践理性批判》的辩证论中实践理性会与理论理性潜在地陷入争论不同,并不存在使审美判断力陷入与实践理性冲突的契机。2,虽然'实践理性相对于审美判断力的优先性'的表述不妥,我也并不就认为在康德处审美领域有一种独属于自己的、独立的价值。当我们追问其价值时,这一设问方式本身就会将我们带回到探寻其对于实践领域的价值的老路上去。3,《实践理性批判》讲到每一种心灵能力都有自己的关切,并明确了理论理性和实践理性各自的关切(Interesse),却未提及审美判断力的关切。我将就康德在这一点上的沉默展开分析,并试图表明:康德之所以不言及审美判断力的关切,有其特别的考虑。

In interpreting the relationship between the autonomy of practical reason and that of aesthetic judgment within Kant’s philosophy, Paul Guyer quotes Kant’s doctrine of “primacy of practical reason” and argues for the primacy of practical reason in its relation to aesthetic judgment. Guyer’s point of view is influential. My discussion will be developed in three aspects: 1. I do not think it is appropriate to introduce the expression “primacy of practical reason” into the discussion on critique of judgment and to advocate the priority of practical reason over aesthetic judgment. Unlike in the Dialectics of Critique of Practical Reason, where practical reason and theoretical reason can get into dispute with each other, there will be no chance of conflict between aesthetic judgment and practical reason. 2. Although the expression “primacy of practical reason to aesthetic judgment” is not appropriate, I do not think that there is an intrinsic, independent value in Kant’s aesthetic field. When we ask about such a value, this mode of inquiry itself will bring us back to the old way of searching for value in the practical field. 3. According to the Critique of Practical Reason, every mental power has its own interest. That Critique clarifies the respective interests of theoretical reason and practical reason but does not mention the interest of aesthetic judgment. I will analyze Kant’s silence on this point and try to show that there is a reason for Kant not to talk about the interest of aesthetic judgment.