克里普克的维特根斯坦

Kripke’s Wittgenstein

索尔·克里普克受到维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》第138至242节中的论述的启发,设计出了一种广受讨论的论证路线,来质疑意义的实在性。克里普克的思路包括一个悖论、它的一种解法,以及这种解法的一种意涵。这个悖论是:对于人们用哪些词表达什么意义这回事,没有什么'真正的'事实。提出的解法是,表明这个悖论性的论证并不是错了,而是它的结论仔细一想是完全可以接受的。这种解法的一个推论会是,没有'私人语言'这种东西。本文会给出对这种说明的一种批判性的评估,并揭示克里普克的维特根斯坦在多大程度上偏离了维特根斯坦本人。

Inspired by Wittgenstein’s discussion in paragraphs 138 to 242 of the Philosophical Investigations,Saul Kripke devised a widely discussed line of argument to question the reality of meaning.The body of Kripke’s thought consists of a paradox,a solution to it,and an implication of that solution.The paradox is that there are no‘genuine’facts as to what people mean by their words.The proposed solution is to show,not that the paradoxical argument is mistaken,but that its conclusion is,on reflection,perfectly tolerable.A corollary of this solution is supposed to be that there can be no such thing as a'private language'.This article offers a critical appraisal of that account,and reveals the substantial extent to which Kripke’s Wittgenstein diverges from Wittgenstein himself.