斯多亚学派的幸福论

Stoic Eudaimonism

斯多亚学派的伦理学是一种幸福论。但是,斯多亚学派面临着两个相互独立但是同样有力的挑战,即'贫乏反驳'和'虚伪反驳'。本文将要论证,斯多亚学派的幸福论是有意义的,当且仅当我们接受了斯多亚学派关于事物运行方式的观点:决定论,神意,幸福对于每个正常的人都是可能的,以及理性的完满性。如果接受这四个立场,那么这种幸福论就是完全前后一致的,既不贫乏也不虚伪。如果不接受这些前提,那么将斯多亚学派的理论与希腊的前辈或者任何现代的继承者进行比较,都对于理解他们的理论没有什么帮助。

Stoic ethics is a kind of eudaimonism,but faces two independent but equally powerful challenges,which are called'the impoverishment objection'and'the disingenuousness objection'.This article argues that Stoic eudaimonism makes good sense if and only if one adopts a Stoic view of the way things are:determinism,divine providence,the availability of happiness to every normal person and the perfectibility of reason.If these four positions are accepted,Stoic eudaimonism turns out to be fully coherent and neither impoverished nor disingenuous.If they are not accepted,you will do Stoic ethics a disservice by assimilating it either to that of its Greek predecessors or to any of its modern successors.