论混合经济中的企业最优国有比重被引量：4

About the Optimal Nationalization Ratio of Firms under Mixed Oligopoly Economy

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摘要改革开放以来中国所有制变化的一个重要特征,就是国有比重下降而非国有比重上升。这表现在中国经济增长中,无论在GDP中所占比重还是在年增长率中所做贡献,非国有经济都已成为经济增长的主力。本文构建了一个两阶段混合寡头博弈竞争模型,旨在探讨混合经济中的最优国有比重问题,进而从理论上对国有企业改革提出政策建议。 The important characteristic of the ownership change of Chinese Economic system is that the ratio of stateowned economy descends since the economic reform.It is embodied in Chinas economic growth which displays both the increase in the ratio of GDP and the rate of growth.In this paper we consider the optimal nationalization ratio of firms on mixed oligopoly economy by using a twostage game model of mixed oligopoly competition.In addition,we will make a proposition from a theoretical view point to the economic policy of the government.

作者张凤海

机构地区冈山大学研究生院

出处《财经问题研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第7期19-28,共10页 Research On Financial and Economic Issues

关键词混合经济数量竞争战略代替产品差别化国有比重 mixed economy quantity competition strategic substitutes product differentiation nationalization ratio

分类号 F123.2 [经济管理—世界经济]

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参考文献9

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二级参考文献13

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9我们将(5)式变形为Di=(2-β+βPj)(1+θi)/2-Pi=0,进而用Pi和Pj对Di进行微分,得到 Di/ Pj=(1+θi)β/2及 Di/ Pi=-1两式.于是写出 D1/ P1+ D2/ P2=-2＜0及 D1/ P1@ D2/ P2- D1/ P2@D2/ P1=1-β2(1+θi)(1+θj)/4＞0,这表明有关稳定性Routh-hurwitz条件成立.因此,第2阶段均衡是全局稳定的.
10经计算可得利润最大化的2阶条件d2Ⅱi/dθ2i=-4[(β-1)2+1]-2β(2-β)2(1+θi)+3β3(1+θi)2＜0.