摘要
融资企业在融资的过程中,易于借助其信息优势发生逆向选择和道德风险,损害投资者的利益,致使投资者发生维护自身利益的行为,形成个体理性与集体理性矛盾的纳什均衡,导致融资市场的低效率。政府借助法律机制和监管机制介入融资市场,建立可置信威胁,能够规范融资企业的行为、消除非对称信息、维护投资者利益、改变纳什均衡,提高融资市场效率,但要防止政府介入过度。对上述结论,笔者进行了实证分析,并证明了其正确性。
In financing,financing enterprise easily does adverse selection and moral hazard by the information advantage and harms the investor's benefit and its outcome is the action that the investor protects his benefit.These produce the Nash equilibrium that is the contradictory of the individual rationality and the collective rationality and the low efficiency in the financing market.The government intervenes the financing market by the law and the control mechanism and builds the believed menace.The government's work can standard the enterprise behavior and remove the asymmetric information and protect the investor's benefit and change the Nash equilibrium and raise the financing market efficiency.But we must prevent the excessive intervene of government.For the abovementioned conclusion,author have completed the positivism analysis and testified that it is right.
出处
《财经问题研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第7期92-96,共5页
Research On Financial and Economic Issues
基金
陕西省 2 0 0 2年度社科基金课题<陕西中小企业融资中的非对称性信息问题研究>
西安交通大学 2 0 0 2年度人文社科基金课题<中国私营企业融资中的非对称信息问题研究>的阶段性成果。
关键词
非对称信息
纳什均衡
政府介入
法律和监管机制
融资市场效率
Asymmetric information
Nash equilibrium
the Government interven
the Law and Control mechanism
Financing market efficiency