风险企业控制权安排的博弈分析

An Analysison the Control Power Arrangement in VC-backed Firm in a Game Way

控制权安排是风险企业所有权结构的中心特征。在风险资本融资时,存在信息不对称和逆向选择问题。创业家向风险资本家转移的控制权是显示其类型的信号,这是一个不完全信息动态博弈问题。拥有控制权的风险资本家会根据事后的信息决定是否对风险企业进行干预。对好创业家来说,成本是很低的;对坏创业家而言,是很大的威胁,从而使好创业家得到融资的同时,减少了坏创业家进行融资的可能性。如果双方事前信息不对称程度较低或者事后风险资本家得到的信息质量较高,相机控制权安排是最优的;反之,风险资本家应该得到全部控制权。

The control power arrangement is a central characteristic in the ownership structure.In VC financing,there is a problem of asymmetric information and adverse selection.In order to signal the type,the EN transfers some control power to the VCs.This is an incomplete information dynamic game problem.The VCs with some control power will decide whether to interfere with the venture businesses according to the ex-post information.Hence,it is cheap for a good EN,while it is a threat for a bad EN.If the asymmetric information between them is not very severe or the quality of the ex post information available to the VCs is high,the contingent control power arrangement is optimal.On the contrary,the VCs must be given full control power.