为何改革没有提高国有企业的相对劳动生产率

Why Does Reform Have not Improved the Relative Labor Productivity of China’s SOEs?

本文用一个国有企业工资和就业决定模型为不同所有制企业间劳动生产率差距越来越大的现象提供了一个理论解释。本文认为，在国有企业的工资和就业决定受到管制的情况下，一些通常被认为有效的改革措施(如提高管理者固定收入和利润分成比率)反而会阻碍企业重构。另外，在改革过程中，国有企业的产值份额越来越小，但其就业份额却仍然非常之大，这就使得政府更加强调国有企业稳定社会的功能。因此，放松管制对于成功的市场化改革和企业重构而言是至关重要的。

This paper builds a wage and employment determination model to explain the en-larging labor productivity difference between enterprises of different ownership types. Under wageand employment regulation, privatization or incentive scheme reform by increasing managers'fixed income or their share in the profits will not lead to SOEs'restructuring, but to the oppositedirection. Nevertheless, with a shrinking share in production but a still large share in employ-ment, SOEs are required more to satisfy such governmental goals as social stability. Therefore,deregulation is most essential to a successful marketization reform and enterprise restructuring.