策略互动与产权的界定——一个非完全信息动态博弈模型及其应用

Strategic Interactions and the Creation of Property Rights:A Dynamic Game Model with Incomplete Information and Its Applications

本文构建了一个非完全信息动态博弈模型。对一个有限经济(economy)内部行为主体的一项基本权利(如产权)的界定与实施过程给出了一种解释。与以往一些博弈论专家在分析制度(尤其产权制度)及制度变迁不同的是，本文在博弈模型中通过非完全信息的假设，引入行为主体策略的差异性。本文给出的结论是：制度是不同的行为人与政府之间的博弈均衡。在文中我们使用的是一种混合均衡的概念——对称完美贝叶斯均衡。最后本文对相应的结论给子了一个现实的说明，并指出了模型可能的进一步发展方向。

This paper develops a dynamic game model with incomplete information and usesit to provide an analytical approach to the study of the creation of property rights. The modeldemonstrates how a property right is created by the strategic interactions among the agents. Inparticular, it explains why many social institutions do not emerge as equilibria in games amongsimilar agents, but as equilibria in games among different agents. Finally, the author applies thetheory to explain some Chinese cases and makes suggestions for future studies.