一种请求权的混合理论

A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Right

在本文中,我提出并捍卫了一种对请求权的新分析。我提议的是,一种对两种最著名的分析——意志理论和利益理论——加以混合的理论。基于良好的理由,这两种理论之间的论辩通常被看成一个僵局。这是因为,意志理论对于利益理论之最好的异议(不可剥夺的权利和无行为能力权利持有者)并没有做出令人满意的回答,而利益理论同样也不能对意志理论的最好异议(第三方受益人)提供令人满意的回应。在回顾了这些不同异议,以及批判了某些试图回应这些异议的最近尝试之后,我引入了我自己的替代方案,一种混合理论,并解释了这一混合理论如何为所有这些异议提供了一个满意的解决方案。

In this article,I propose and defend a new analysis of claimrights.My proposal is a hybrid of the two best known analyses,the Will theory and the Interest theory.For good reason,the debate between these theories is often regarded as a stand-off.That is because the Will theory has had no satisfactory answer to the Interest theory’s best objections(inalienable rights and incompetent right-holders),while the Interest theory has likewise had no satisfactory answer to the Will theory’s best objection(third party beneficiaries).After reviewing these various objections and criticizing some recent attempts to meet them,I introduce my hybrid alternative and explain how it provides a satisfactory solutiont.