摘要
现今的委托———代理关系研究,主要是对所有者(出资者)与经营者之间的委托———代理问题进行探讨,局限于公司治理层面上,尚未延伸到企业组织内部。本文将研究视角放在企业内部管理链中的委托———代理关系问题的研究上,并对旨在降低代理成本的激励约束机制进行探讨。
The current research about the principalagent relations is mainly focused on the issues of principalagent between owners and managers, confined to the level of corporate governance, and not extended to the interior of enterprises organization. This study concerns the issues of principalagent relation in the management chain of enterprise interior. The incentiverestrain mechanism that is to decrease the cost of agent is also explored in this study.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2003年第4期61-63,共3页
East China Economic Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"知识经济与企业组织变革"(项目批准号:01JB630006)部分研究成果。