道德风险与最优保险产品设计模型

Design on the Optimal Insurance Products under Moral Hazard

使用委托—代理理论建立一种保险产品设计模型 ,分别就信息对称和存在道德风险情况探讨了保险产品的特征和性质。在信息对称条件下 ,最优的保险产品可以实现保险人与被保险人之间的帕累托(Pareto)最优风险分担 ,并讨论了该情形下某些保险产品的形式。在非对称信息条件下 ,由于道德风险的存在 ,最优的保险产品不能达到帕累托最优的风险分担 ,探讨了该情形下具有激励机制与功能的保险产品的特征与性质 ,并一般化了 [2 ]中的某些结果。

In this paper, the design of the optimal insurance products is discussed by using the theory of trust- agent. Some propertirs of the insurance products are given under the symmetric information and moral hazard respectively. Under symmetric information, the optimal product can obtain Pareto risk sharing between insurer and insured, and some forms of the kind of insurance products are given. Under asymmetric information,the optimal insurance product can't obtain Pareto risk sharing, and properties of insurance products with incentive scheme are researched. Some results in are generalized in some aspects.