国有商业银行管理的博弈分析

The Game Theory Analysis on the Management of State-owned Commercial Banks

以委托——代理理论分析国有商业银行现存管理体制的弊端,并通过一个简单的委托——代理模型说 明解决问题的关键所在。国有商业银行经营管理效率低下的原因主要在于现行管理体制中管理链过长,激励 机制不当。根据分析结果,为国有商业银行改革提供理论上的依据,并提出解决的方法。

With the principle-agent theory, the paper analyzes the deficiencies in the existing management system of state-owned enterprises. Through a simple principle-agent model, it works out the solution, that is, to solve the problem of too long management chain and improve the improper encouragement mechanism, both of which contribute to the low efficiency of the management in state-owned commercial banks.