治理结构、预期收入与体制转轨:金融反腐败机制设计的微观与宏观战略

Governance, Expected Income and Reform: Micro and Macro Solutions of Anti-Corruption Regime

本文从体制转轨和预期收入两方面研究制度对金融腐败的影响,提出了金融腐败的微观面与宏观面性质。其微观面性质指金融腐败与其他腐败一样,是公众与金融部门间、金融部门上下级委托-代理关系间信息不对称情况下,代理人通过衡量预期收入和风险后的理性选择,或者说是权力缺乏监督与制约的产物,因而属于治理结构的范畴;其宏观面性质指体制转轨造就的“转轨利益集团”及其特定的权钱交易。根据金融腐败的微观与宏观性质,本文相应提出了反腐败机制建设的微观思路与宏观思路。微观思路是狭义的反腐败机制,包括以下三项内容:第一,建立独立于同级行政机构、纵向负责的金融反腐败组织体系;第二,建立类似长期储蓄的“反腐败保险个人帐户”,以调整金融机构和监管部门的预期收入,降低其腐败倾向;第三,建立有效的举报机制,允许风闻言事,形成对权力的外部监督。宏观思路则是把反腐败机制建设建立在整个经济体制改革大框架内的广义思路,同样包括三项内容:第一,经济转轨意味着本应由市场配置的资源依然部分地集中于行政部门,同时也意味着市场交易的引进,因而形成了改革的“中间过程利益集团”,他们总是希望改革停顿于某一环节,以最大化租金收入,就此,不断深化改革,把资源配置权进一步向市场分散是解决之道;第 二,经济转?

This paper studies financial corruption on the basis of expected income and economic transition , to show the micro macro properties of financial corruption. At the micro level, similar to other corruption, financial corruption is an optimal decision by agents given the information structure and incentives. At the macro level, financial corruption is a power-cash transaction of the vested interest group on transition. Thus, this paper offers both micro and macro solutions. At micro level, there are three remedies. First, the inspection institution should be a vertical and independent organization. Second, a regime of anti-corruption insurance individual account should be introduced to agent' s expectation. Third, information collection mechanism should be improved through encouraging bottom-up reporting. At the macro level, downward power resolution and transparency improvement are two measures to constrain corruption, however, it is risky for reform leaders.