非对称信息条件下供应链管理质量控制策略

Incentives Strategy of Quality Control in Supply Chain on Asymmetrical Information Conditions

研究非对称信息条件下供应链管理的质量控制问题·建立了供应链合作关系中的购买商和供应商的质量成本模型,其中包括供应商的生产理性约束条件·分析了非对称信息条件下购买商与供应商质量成本的委托代理关系,质量水平的不可观测性则表现为供应商的信息隐匿·实质上,这是一个委托代理中的逆向选择问题·购买商的质量成本是目标函数,供应商质量成本的一阶条件转化为状态空间方程,运用极大值原理求解该问题的最优质量控制·并进行了非对称信息条件下供应链的质量控制仿真实验·

The quality control in supply chain management was studied on asymmetrical information conditions. The quality-cost models for supplier and buyer were set up,respectively,including the rational restrictions on supplier's production. The principal-agent relationship between supplier and buyer was analyzed on asymmetrical information conditions by which the unobservability of quality level is regarded as that the supplier concealed information from the buyer and,in fact,it is a converse selection problem of the relationship. The quality-cost function of buyer is an objective function while that of supplier becomes a (state-space) equation by converting the conditions of the objective function into first order conditions. The optimum quality control problem was thus solved on maxima principle. A simulation was done for quality control in supply chain on asymmetrical information conditions.