我国上市公司独立董事制度的博弈分析

A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Independent Director System in Listed Companies in China

独立董事制度作为一种旨在加强上市公司监督机制的手段,在我国现有的公司治理结构下是否有效?运用博弈论的方法,通过建立两个博弈模型,揭示了在我国上市公司内部人控制较严重的背景下,由上市公司选择独立董事的做法难以发挥其应有的作用,而如果改由证监会选聘独立董事,将更有利于独立董事制度职能的实现。

Is the independent director system, which is a means of strenthening the monitoring mechanism and process in listed companies, applicable to Chinese companies that have their own governance structures? In this paper, two models are set up on the basis of Game theory, and the following coclusion has been arrived at: the independent director system is not efficient in China because of its serious internal corporate control and the fact that independent directors are selected by the listed companies, whereas the situation may be improved if the independent directors are appointed by CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission).