任期经济责任审计的制度分析与创新

Analysis and Innovation of In-office Economic Responsibility Audit System

代理成本是影响经济运行效率的重要因素之一。该文以信息经济学的相关理论为基本框架,分析国有企业的委托代理关系,指出因契约的不完全性和激励相容机制的缺乏,我国国有企业存在严重的代理问题,任期经济责任审计可以作为控制与降低代理成本的有效措施。提出在当前环境下,有效发挥作用的任期经济责任审计制度的设计应合理界定审计关系、内容、范围,同时审计主体及审计结果方面均需要相应的制度安排。

Agency cost is one of the key factors which influence the efficiency of economic operations. This paper investigates principle-agency relationships in China's state-owned enterprises in the theoretic frame of informational economics analysis. Our research reveals that China's state-owned enterprises are facing severe principle-agency problems due to incomplete contracts and lack of incentive mechanism. In-office economic responsibility audit can effectively control and decrease agency costs. We suggest that in order to ensure the effective performance of in-office economic responsibility audit, audit relationship and audit area need to be correctly determined. Simultaneously audit subject and audit result also need corresponding systems to regulate.