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商业银行信贷合约行为分析 被引量:1

Analysis of the Commercial Bank Credit Contract Behavior
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摘要 在商业银行与借款者之间,既存在事前非对称信息,又存在事后非对称信息,使之产生信贷风险.针对这种信息结构,商业银行分别在事前与事后采取甄别行动与审查行动,即事前甄别,改进了借款者的信用质量;事后审查,降低了借款者的毁约率,从而改善不对称信息结构,进而提高商业银行的预期收益函数值. There is not only ex ante nonsymmetric information, but also ex post nonsymmetric information between the commercial banks and the borrowers, and then lead to produce the credit risk. In order to improve this information structure and raise the expected yield function of the banks, the banks take the different actions before and after the event respectively, such as screening and monitoring, namely screen in advance, improve the borrower's credit quality; and monitor afterwards, then reduce the borrower's breaking promise rate.
出处 《河北工业大学学报》 CAS 2003年第4期53-56,共4页 Journal of Hebei University of Technology
关键词 筛选 审查 甄别成本 审查成本 预期收益函数 标准信贷合约 screen monitor screening cost monitoring cost the expected yield function standard debt contract
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参考文献3

  • 1Gale D, hellwig M. Incentive-compatible Debt Contracts: the one period problem[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1985, 647-664.
  • 2Joseph E, Stiglitz, Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing With Many Borrowers [J]. American Economic Review, 1987, 77:228-231.
  • 3Riley J. Credit Rationing A Further Remark[J]. American Economic Review, 1987, 77: 224-227.

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