审计质量、关联交易与高管薪酬激励——基于我国A股制造业上市公司的实证研究

Audit Quality, Connected Transactions and Executive Compensation Incentives——An Empirical Study Based on China's A-share Manufacturing Listed Companies

本文以2013-2016年我国A股制造业上市公司为样本,检验以下两大大问题:集团内关联交易和审计质量是否会对高管薪酬产生影响?关联交易能否在审计质量和高管薪酬的关系中发挥调节变量的作用?研究结果表明:关联交易会对高管薪酬水平产生消极影响;审计质量的提高会引起高管薪酬水平的上升;关联交易对审计质量与高管薪酬之间的关系产生调节作用,显著削弱高管薪酬对审计质量的反映系数。

This paper examines the following two major questions from the 2013-2016 A-share manufacturing listed companies in China: Will the related party transactions and audit quality affect the executive compensation? Can related party transactions play a role in regulating variables in the relationship between audit quality and executive compensation? The research results show that the related party transactions will have a negative impact on the executive compensation level;the improvement of the audit quality will lead to the increase of the executive compensation level;the related party transaction will have a regulatory effect on the relationship between audit quality and executive compensation, significantly weakening the executives. The coefficient of reflection of compensation on audit quality.