国家赔偿的制度逻辑与本土构造

The Institutional Logic of State Compensation and Its Native Structure in China

国家司法救助与国家赔偿有着天然的制度亲和性,但是,将两者并立于本土化的"国家责任"概念之下,不但无助于司法救助制度的发展,而且固化了国家赔偿制度的"政策实施"色彩,从而进一步削弱了其"纠纷解决"功能。当前,我国的《国家赔偿法》存在实体上和程序上的两大制度悖论,而实践中的应对策略则证明,国家赔偿的"纠纷解决"功能正在向正式制度之外逃逸。议价筹码均衡与程序中立性作为"纠纷解决型程序"的两大基本要素,在非正式场合中分别获致。但在"维稳"等因素的影响下,议价筹码有时会走向另一种不均衡状态,导致政府在面对恶意的赔偿请求时陷入被动,形成缠诉闹访的恶性循环。在构建我国本土化的国家赔偿乃至国家责任体系时,应当正视实践中客观存在的案外协调现象,恢复国家赔偿制度的"纠纷解决"功能。司法体制改革应警惕"政策实施"与"科层化"的反渗透。

There is a natural institutional affinity between judicial aid law and state compensation law in China. Some scholars proposed that the term of“State Liability”should include judicial aid law. However,this proposal would hinder the development of judicial aid law and solidify the “policy-implementing”feature of state compensation law. China’s state compensation law doesn’ t provide equalized “bargaining chip”and neutralized “racing process”for both parties. As both parties demand “conflict-solving”mechanism,these two features fleeted into informal domain from formal state compensation process. Under the pressure of “Weiwen”,informal “bargaining chips” often favor the plaintiffs. While local governments prefer solving conflicts informally,plaintiffs would probably benefit from this preference and bring endless “letter and petition”cases to local governments or even the central government. To construct China’s native state compensation law and state liability system,we should face directly and learn from these informal intermediation phenomena. Furthermore,we should restore the “conflict - solving”function of state compensation law,and guard the judicial reform against the “policy-implementing”and bureaucratization.