摘要
建立建设工程施工单位与政府安全生产监督管理部门之间的博弈模型,分析博弈模型中的假设条件,并对施工单位和安监部门的具体行为作了详尽的分析。施工单位对建设工程安全文明措施费的资金投入直接影响到企业的经济效益和社会效益,而政府安全生产监督管理部门的监察会促使施工单位对安全文明生产的投入。用混合战略纳什均衡计算出其均衡值,为施工单位和安监部门的行为决策提供了参考,给安监部门提供了相应的监察策略建议。
Game model of the construction engineering units with government safety production supervision and management departments is established,and the game model assumptions is analyzed,and a detailed analysis of specific acts of construction units and safety supervision department is made. The civilized fee funding for construction safety measures will directly affect the economic and social benefits,and the government's safety production supervision and management departments will monitor the construction unit for the safe and civilized production inputs. The authors calculate its equilibrium value with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. It provides a reference for the construction unit and supervision departments to make corresponding safety supervision recommendations.
出处
《施工技术》
CAS
北大核心
2014年第S2期501-503,共3页
Construction Technology
基金
四川省教育厅科研项目"安全文明措施费合理投入与施工管理效果研究"(14SB0404)
关键词
安全生产投入
博弈模型
纳什均衡
监察策略
措施费
safety input
game model
Nash equilibrium
monitoring strategies
measures fee