重新思考偏见

The Concept of Prejudice Reconsidered

今天我们常常将偏见与无知和固执联系在一起,将其视作不正义的来源。我们通常将偏见看作明晰判断的障碍。如康德等启蒙思想家认为,当我们的判断不依赖于任何未经明确验证的来源或影响时,我们才能得到最好的判断。偏见会阻挠我们获得最好的判断。然而在我看来,以完全超然的方式来获得判断的愿望是具有误导性的;慎思与判断总是在我们生活的处境内展开的。如果判断不可避免是处境化的,那么完全清除我们脑中偏见的企图就可能是具有误导性的。事实上,偏见是判断不可避免的一种特征;我们总是在我们自己的生活环境中去判断和理解的。我们生活环境中的某些特征、某些偏见(习惯、传统、经验),也许能帮助我们去更好地判断。在此意义上,偏见是理性的一种表现方式,而不是对理性的背叛。如果我们将偏见看作是理性的一个面向,那么我们将承认它是定义我们与世界关系的参与式理解的一个有力例证,而不是一种阻碍人们获得明晰判断的有害模式。

Today we often associate prejudice with ignorance and stubbornness and regard it as a source of injustice. We usually see prejudice as an obstacle to clear judgment. Such as Kant and other enlightenment thinkers believe that when our judgments do not depend on any unidentified source or influence we can get the best judgment. Prejudice will prevent us from getting the best judgment. In my opinion,however, the desire to obtain judgment in a completely detached way is misleading; we always get the thought and judgment in the situations of our life. If judgment is unavoidably situated, then the attempt to clear all the prejudice in our brain may be misleading. In fact, prejudice is an inevitable feature of judgment; we always gain understanding and judgments in our own living environment. Some of the characteristics of our living environment, certain prejudices(habits, traditions, experiences) may help us to better judge. In this sense, prejudice is one manifestation of reason, not a betrayal of reason. If we see prejudice as one aspect of reason, then we will admit that it is a powerful example of the engaged understanding of our relationship with the world,rather than a detrimental model that hinders people from making clear judgments.