儒家价值实在论能否抵制Sharon Street的达尔文式挑战?

Can Confucian Value Realism Desist Sharon Street’s Darwinian Challenge?

在'价值观实在论的达尔文式困境'中,Sharon Street对所有自然主义形式的价值实在论提出了挑战,她称之为'达尔文式的挑战'。Street认为如果价值实在论者坚持认为独立的价值真理和人类自然进化发展出来的评价态度之间没有联系,那么他们就无法避免怀疑论的宣明,把我们的大多数评价态度都看作是'偏离真理轨道的'。反过来说,如果价值实在论者承认在进化的影响和价值真理之间存在着某种关联,那么,价值真理便只是自然进化而来的评价态度的总和,也就是说价值真理是由人类进化而来的评价态度而建构出来的。要是价值实在论者坚持道德价值是客观独立于人类的评价态度,那么他们就必须想出一个令人不可思议的答案来解释人类的评价态度如何能够正确掌握到这些客观独立的道德真理。Street得出的结论是,价值实在论者将不得不放弃他们对独立于人类评价态度的道德真理存在的信念。这也就是放弃价值实在论的立场。本文将捍卫儒家的价值实在论,从而抵制Street的达尔文式挑战。本文的儒家自然主义的价值实在论以传统儒家(尤其是孟子)以及宋明理学的道德心理学为理论基础。儒家价值实在论者可以接受Street所言进化过程会影响人类原态度(proto-attitude)的讲法。这是传统儒家肯定人类社会中普遍存在着道德情感——孟子所讲的'道德四端'。但是他们不会认同把道德真理的内容完全化约成人类原态度的演化。儒家价值实在论肯定道德真理存在的客观性,也认定道德真理的内容不是建立于人类由进化影响而形成的评价态度上。

In "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value", Sharon Street launches a challenge to all naturalist forms of value realism, which she calls "the Darwinian Challenge". Street argued that if value realists insist that there is no connection between independent value truths and our naturally evolved evaluative attitudes, then they cannot avoid the skeptical result that most of our evaluative attitudes are "off track". If, on the other hand, value realists concede that there is a relation between evolutionary influences and value truths, then either that value truths are simply the function of, or a construction based on, our naturally evolved evaluative attitudes, or the realists would have to come up with an incredible account of how our evaluative attitudes could just track independent moral truths if it weren’t for the adaptation process in our evolution. Street reaches the conclusion that value realists would have to give up their conviction in the existence of moral truths that are independent of human evaluative attitudes. This paper will defend Confucian value realism against Street’s Darwinian Challenge. It shall construct a naturalist value realism based on both classical Confucian(Mencius in particular) and neo-Confucian moral psychology. A Confucian value realist will accept Street s contention that natural selection has had a tremendous influence on the kind of evaluative proto-attitudes that humans have — Mencius calls them our "moral sprouts",but would reject her conclusion that the contents of moral truths must be derived from, or are dependent on these proto-attitudes naturally evolved. On Confucian value realism, the objectivity as well as the content of moral truth is not dependent on evolutionary influences or our proto-attitudes.