儒家传统中的人权思想

Human Rights in Chinese Tradition

当代中国儒学和人权之辩主要有三种进路:(1)儒学是人权发展的障碍;(2)儒学是人权的一种替代;(3)儒学是人权思想的源泉。本文对上述三个观点做了考察。每种形式的障碍——等级礼制、缺乏概念、统一价值领域和关系论——都是真实存在的,但并非无法跨越,实际上本文论证了儒家应该支持儒学传统朝着向人权话语开放的方向发展。儒学也提供了积极的可代替人权的方案,但我认为儒学式'替代'和人权规范联合起来才是现代世界所需的。通过不同途径寻找中国传统中的人权资源尊严、利益和道德——都显示出某种希望,尽管这些途径单个来看都不能证明儒学已经在新时代做好了吸收人权思想的准备。这些资源是现代儒家支持人权之辩良好的着手点,但再次说明传统要接纳人权的话,就需要发展和调整。在中国人权之辩下一个篇章的谱写中,现代儒学有望起到建设性的作用。

Among the perspectives on the relation between Chinese tradition and human rights today, we can identify three different approaches: the Chinese tradition is(1) an obstacle to human rights,(2) an alternative to human rights, or(3) a source of human rights. This paper examines these three approaches in detail. Each of the forms of barrier — hierarchical rituals, lack of concept, unified field of value, and relationality —is genuine but not insuperable, and in fact the paper argues that modern Confucians should embrace the development of their tradition in directions that open up space for human rights discourse. Chinese tradition also offers attractive alternatives to human rights, but I insist that both the Confucian "alternatives" and human rights norms should joint together in the modern world The different approaches to finding a source for human rights in Chinese tradition — dignity, interests, and virtue — all show some promise, though none simply demonstrates that Confucianism was ready-made to adopt human rights when it entered the modern age. These sources are excellent starting points for modern Confucian arguments in favor of human rights, but once again the tradition needs to grow and adapt if it is to welcome human rights.