阐释的悖论、隐含的规范性和人性:从比较哲学的视角重审意志薄弱问题

Interpretational Paradox,Implicit Normativity,and Human Nature:Revisiting Weakness of Will from a Perspective of Comparative Philosophy

本文从一个比较哲学的新视角出发,结合对戴维森广受忽视的非理性悖论的关注,批判性地介入了古老而又备受争议的意志薄弱问题的大量现存工作。它旨在揭示批判性阐释观的描述性方面和规范性方面的相互作用,以及揭示当成真和做成真之间的一种特殊关系,这种特殊关系的揭示有助于解释柏拉图原则和孟子的某些范例原则的描述性外衣之非偶然性。同样地,它也阐明了动态规范性的一种确定的隐含类型的某种整体图像,比如,它明显可运用于孟子、荀子关于人性问题的争论,但当代比较哲学仍较少地关注和阐述过这一图像。

This essay critiques or engages a wide range of existing works on the ancient and well-contested issue of weakness of will,from a new perspective of comparative philosophy combined with a focus on a largely neglected Davidsonian paradox of irrationality.It aims at revealing the interplay between the descriptive and the normative in the very notion of critical interpretation,as well as a special relation between holdingtrue and making-true which helps to explain the non-accidentalness of the descriptive coat of the Plato Principle and some of the Mencian paradigmatic tenets.By the same token,it also sheds light on some holistic picture about a certain implicit type of dynamic normativity,which seems evidently applicable to,for example,the Mencius-Xunzi(孟子—荀子)dispute on human nature,but scarcely noticed or articulated in contemporary contexts of comparative philosophy.