基于进化博弈的水利工程施工安全监督管理

Construction safety supervision of water conservancy projects based on evolutionary game

为了探讨影响水利工程建设施工安全监督管理行为的因素,分析施工监督管理进化稳定策略,在水利工程建设监理单位和施工承包商具有有限理性的前提下,运用博弈论方法,构建了基于进化博弈的水利工程建设监理单位和施工承包商的博弈模型。对进化博弈稳定策略的分析结果表明:水利工程建设监理单位对水利工程建设施工安全监督管理的策略选择主要和严格监督管理成本与奖励、监督管理失误率、监督管理可能受到的惩罚等有关;施工承包商对水利工程严格施工的策略选择主要和严格施工成本与奖励、不严格施工可能受到的惩罚等有关;水利工程建设监理单位和施工承包商之间的进化博弈稳定策略与各影响因素的初始值有关。最后运用Matlab软件进行数值仿真,模拟博弈双方之间的动态博弈过程,并提出加强我国水利工程建设施工过程中安全监督管理的建议。

In order to discuss the influence factors for behaviors of construction safety supervision of water conservancy projects,the evolutionarily stable strategy( ESS) of construction safety supervision is analyzed.Using the method of game theory,an evolutionary game model for supervising units and construction contractors is established based on the assumption that both of them have bounded rationality. The results of ESS show that the choices of supervising units are influenced by the degree of supervision cost and reward, error rate of supervision and the possible punishment,and those of construction contractors are influenced by the degree of construction cost and reward and the possible punishment. The ESS of the supervising units and construction contractors is associated with the initial values of various factors.Finally, a numerical simulation for dynamic game between the two sides is performed by using the Matlab software. Some suggestions are put forward for strengthening the construction safety supervision of water conservancy projects in China.