混合所有制、股权制衡与国企过度投资:基于政治观和经理人观的解释

Mixed Ownership,the Check-and-balance of Stock Ownership and the Over Investment of State-owned Enterprises: An Explanation Based on the View of Politics and Managers

检验混合所有制改革如何影响国企过度投资及其作用机制,研究发现:提高混合主体的股权制衡度对于缓解国有企业的过度投资有显著的积极效应。但不同类型的混合所有权方式对过度投资的影响存在差异:在国有控股企业中,实施国有+外资混合股权结构以及国有+外资+民营混合股权结构,均有助于降低企业的过度投资水平;但当混合股权结构中只包含民营股东时,混合主体的股权制衡度与国有企业过度投资水平则不存在统计意义上的显著性。进一步研究发现,相对于政府干预效应,经理人代理效应是混合股权制衡度影响国企过度投资的主导机制,即经理人观对国企非效率投资问题的解释力相对更为有效。

In the context of mixed ownership reform,this paper analyzes how the ownership structure affects the level of over investment of state-owned enterprises. Using the sample of state-owned enterprises from2001 to 2013,it finds that improving the balance degree of mixed ownership has a significant positive effect on alleviating the excessive investment of the state-owned enterprises. When the mixed ownership structure consists of foreign shareholders,the relationship between the balance degree of mixed ownership and the over investment level of state owned enterprises is negatively correlated. But when the mixed ownership structure contains only the private shareholders,there is no statistical significance of the relationship between the balance degree of mixed ownership and the over investment level of state owned enterprises. Further research finds that the balance degree of mixed ownership can affect the level of over investment of state-owned enterprises through two paths: the agency effect of managers and the effect of government intervention,and the key mechanism is the effect of manager agency.