CEO继任来源、高管团队重组与薪酬差距的激励效应

CEO Successor Resource,TMT Recomposition and the Incentive Effect of Executive Pay Gap

基于高管行为整合理论对CEO变更情境下高管团队重组与高管薪酬差距及其激励效应的关系进行实证检验。发现在CEO发生变更的情况下,高管团队重组与高管薪酬差距显著负相关,且高管团队重组会削弱高管薪酬差距对企业绩效的正向激励作用;这可理解为企业为了抑制高管团队重组对高管团队合作的破坏行为,在高管团队发生重组时,会尽可能地缩小高管薪酬差距以促进高管行为快速整合。此外,相对于内部继任,当CEO为外部继任时,高管团队重组对锦标赛作用的削弱程度相对更大一些,即外部继任的CEO其所面对的高管行为整合程度要远大于内部继任的情形。

Based on the perspective of TMT behavioral integration,this paper studies the influence of CEO successor resource and TMT recomposition on executive pay gap and its incentive effects. In the case of CEO change,it shows a negative relation between TMT recomposition and pay gap. And TMT recomposition weakens the positive correlation between pay gap and performance. It means that enterprises will narrow the gap as much as possible in order to prevent the destruction of executive team's cooperation and promote the rapid integration of executive behavior when TMT recomposition happens. Furthermore,this weakening effect is more serious when CEO is an outside successor,which means that external CEO will face a higher degree of behavioral integration than internal CEO. The conclusions will be beneficial for the building of incentive mechanism in the situation of TMT recomposition.