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机构投资者持股、高管超额薪酬与公司治理 被引量:14

Institutional Investors' Holdings,Executives' Excess Compensation and Corporate Governance
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摘要 既有文献局限于将机构投资者视为无差异的分析对象,使得关于上市公司外部机构投资者在公司治理中究竟扮演"监督者""合谋者"、抑或"旁观者"的角色至今仍未有明确定论。基于机构投资者的个体异质性视角,选取我国2010年~2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验异质个体机构投资者持股与高管超额薪酬之间的关系,以此考察个体机构投资者在公司治理中的角色。研究结果表明:整体层面上,机构投资者持股的深度和广度都有助于降低高管超额薪酬,并且后者的抑制效应相对较大;个体层面上,证券投资基金持股比例与高管超额薪酬正相关,券商、保险公司、社保基金、信托公司等机构投资者持股比例与高管超额薪酬负相关,未有证据表明QFII、财务公司、银行等机构投资者持股与高管超额薪酬存在明显的相关性。上述结果说明,券商、保险公司、社保基金、信托公司等机构投资者在降低上市公司代理成本方面主要扮演"监督者"角色,证券投资基金更多体现为"合谋者",而QFII、财务公司、银行等机构投资者主要持"旁观者"的态度。 The existing literature is limited to the analysis of institutional investors as indiscriminate subjects,making it still unclear of which role institutional investors play in corporate governance such as a supervisor,collaborator or bystanders.Based on the perspective of individual heterogeneity of institutional investors,this paper takes China’s 2010-2017 A-share listed companies as research samples and empirically tests the heterogeneous individual institutional investors’shareholding and executives’excess compensation to investigate the role institutional investors play in corporate governance.The results show tha:On the whole,the depth and breadth of institutional investors’shareholdings can help reduce the executives’excess compensation,and the latter’s suppression effect is relatively more significant;on the individual side,the proportion of stockholders in securities investment funds is positively correlated with executives’excess compensation,while the proportion of institutional investors in broker companies,securities firms,social security funds and trust companies is negatively correlated with with executives’excess compensation;there is no evidence suggesting that QFII,financial companies,and banks’shareholdings are related with executives’excess compensation.The above results show that institutional investors in broker companies,insurance companies,social security funds,and entrust companies mainly act as'supervisiors'in reducing the agency costs of listed companies;securities investment funds are more likely to be'collaborators',while investors from QFII,financial institutions,financial companies,and banks mainly play the role of'onlooker'.
作者 陈晓珊 刘洪铎 CHEN Xiao-shan;LIU Hong-duo(School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou 510320;School of Economics and Trade,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou 510006,China)
出处 《广东财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第2期46-59,共14页 Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics
基金 广东省哲学社会科学"十三五"规划青年项目(GD18YYJ04)
关键词 机构投资者 高管 超额薪酬 异质性 公司治理 监督者 合谋者 旁观者 institutional investors executives excess compensation heterogeneity corporate governance supervisors collaborators bystanders
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