高管非货币性私有收益与薪酬有关吗——基于契约参照点理论的实证检验

Do Executives Non-Monetary Private Benefits Relate to Compensation——An Empirical Study Based on the Contract Reference Point Theory

突破委托代理框架下最优契约理论的分析范式,从契约参照视角出发,基于我国A股2010—2016年间的上市企业数据实证检验了高管薪酬激励与非货币性私有收益之间的作用机理,以及薪酬契约参照点效应对高管非货币性私有收益的影响机制。研究发现:(1)我国高管薪酬激励与非货币性私有收益之间存在显著负相关关系,且明显会受到契约参照点的影响,即高管薪酬激励相较于契约参照点的得益越少,其通过攫取非货币性私有收益以获取替代性补偿激励的动机就越强;(2)在'得益-损失'价值函数下,处于损失区域的高管对非货币性私有收益的攫取倾向对契约参照点效应的反应更为敏感,且二者敏感度在不同产权性质下存在显著差异;(3)以'八项规定'为代表的政府宏观政策、企业中观层面的任期垂直对特征以及微观层面的个体晋升预期对二者之间的关系都起到了有效的调节作用,抑制了高管对非货币性私有收益的攫取行为。

This study broke the optimal contract analytical paradigm which was based on the principal-agent framework, then selected the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2016 as the sample, and empirically tested the relationship and influencing mechanism between executives’ compensation incentives and non-monetary private benefits from the view of contract reference point.The results indicate as follows. Firstly, there is a negative relationship between executive compensation incentive and non-monetary private benefits, which is also influenced by contract reference point. That is, when executive compensation is lower than the reference point, the motivation of grabbing non-monetary private benefits would be more stronger being caused by loss aversion. Secondly, under the'gains and losses'value function, the negative effect of contract reference point on non-monetary private benefits is more obvious when executives’ compensation belong to 'losses area'. The sensitivity of executives’ reaction differs in companies with different property rights. Finally, there are three regulating factors in the relationship between executives’ compensation incentives and non-monetary private benefits, that is, external supervision mechanism like 'eight-point'rules, the features of the tenure vertical dyad linkage of corporate governance mechanism and individual promotion expectation, which effectively inhibit executives’ behaviors of grabbing non-monetary private benefits.