摘要
基于异方差识别法和CoVaR方法,以中国上市银行季度数据为样本,实证研究了货币政策冲击对银行系统性风险的影响,并检验了债权激励机制对二者关系的调节效应。研究发现,宽松的货币政策冲击会提高银行系统性风险。进一步地,债权激励机制能够有效减弱货币政策冲击对银行系统性风险的作用,其调节效应主要通过提高银行的净盈利能力和降低银行的道德风险来实现。
Based on heteroskedasticity identification method and CoVaR method,this paper used quarterly data of Chinese listed banks to empirically analyze the impact of monetary policy shock on bank systemic risk and the moderation effect of debt-based incentives in their midst.Results show that loose monetary policy shock has exacerbated bank systemic risk,while debt-based incentives can effectively weaken such effect of monetary policy shock.The moderation effect of debt-based incentives results from the improvement of banks’net profitability and the reduction of their moral hazard.
作者
黄秀路
葛鹏飞
HUANG Xiu-lu;GE Peng-fei(Jinhe Center for Economic Research,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049,China;Graduate School of Economics,Nagoya University,Nagoya 464-8601,Japan;School of Economics and Management,Northwest University,Xi’an 710127,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第8期44-56,共13页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(19YJC790034)
国家留学基金委项目(留金发[2018]3101)
关键词
银行系统性风险
货币政策冲击
债权激励
中介调节效应
宏观审慎监管
bank systemic risk
monetary policy shock
debt-based incentives
mediated moderation effect
macro-prudential regulation