半强制性业绩预告制度对上市公司盈余管理的影响

Research on the Effect of Semi-Mandatory Performance Forecast System on Listed Companies’ Earnings Management

基于管理层隐藏坏消息的倾向,本文检验中国半强制性业绩预告制度中'净利润较上年下降超过50%'这一条例是否会引发盈余管理。以2003—2016年主板A股上市公司为样本,采用盈余分布法和多元回归分析分别对盈余管理的存在和方式选择进行研究,发现盈余分布在'净利润下降50%'临界点处表现出显著的非连续性,临界值右侧附近上市公司有显著较高的应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理。进一步检验表明,上述结果更可能发生于非国有公司和机构持股比例较低的公司。本文的研究结论对投资者的投资决策、监管者的监管活动以及政策制定者的政策完善均具有指导意义。

Considering the tendency of bad news hiding in management,this study investigated whether Chinese semi-mandatory performance forecast system may trigger earnings management.We focused on the term of‘net profit decreasing more than 50%comparing to that in last year’,and used Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2016 as our sample.Through adopting earnings distribution test and multivariates regression analysis,we seperately explored the existence and mode selection of earnings management.The result reveals that,at the critical point of‘net profit decreasing 50%’,earnings distribution is obviously discontinued.And the listed companies locating in the right side near the critical point both have higher accrual earnings management and real earnings management.Further test shows that,above results more likely exist in non-state companies and firms with lower proportion of institutional ownership.Findings are instructive to the investment dicision-making of investors,the regulatory activity of regulators and the policy perfection of policy makers.